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Introduction
This policy brief presents the argument that the 
governance of timber resources in Ghana, while 
failing to support officially stated policy objec-
tives, serves the private interests of politicians. 
This argument is supported by a case study of the 
political economy of timber governance in Ghana 
with emphasis on the allocation and taxation of 
timber. Specifically, it is shown that politicians 
in Ghana have maintained discretionary control 
over timber rights allocation and a low taxation 
level. It is suggested that this state of affairs, and 
its reproduction over decades despite numerous 
attempts at reform, may – at least partly – be ex-
plained through patron-client relations between 
the political elite and timber firms in Ghana.
Background
Ghana’s timber resources are located in the 
Southern-most one-third of the country (High 
Forest Zone). Timber utilization is organised 
through a concession regime where the forest 
administration allocates long (typically 40 years) 
and short term (typically 5 years) leases to pri-
vate timber firms in return for payment of vari-
ous fees (Table 1). The current forest legislation 
is crafted under the umbrella of the 1994 Forest 
and Wildlife Policy, which stipulates a forest 
(fiscal) regime capturing the full resource rent 
to the benefit of all segments of the Ghanaian 
society and to ensure efficient resource utiliza-
tion. The means to achieve this end is identified 
as competitive bidding for timber rights. 
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Timber harvesting is under-taxed and extra-legal procedures characterize the allocation of 
timber rights, both of which run against official policy directives. 
This demise is most likely the result of patron-client relations that reproduce political power 
structures and provide rent seeking opportunities to timber firms in good standing with the 
political elite.
These relationships may go a long way in explaining the slow pace of forest policy reform in 
Ghana, e.g. in relation to REDD and FLEGT. 
Policy Conclusions
Results
(i) Timber rights allocation and allocation processes
No official statistics or information is available on timber 
rights allocation in Ghana. We therefore compiled a database 
on timber rights in existence in 2005 by combining pieces of 
information from various sources, i.e. government reports, 
papers and internal documents and files. We estimate a total 
area of 3.2 million ha of forest under various forms of timber 
rights: 1.8 million ha are under long-term contracts (typically 
between 40 and 99 years) and 1.4 million ha under short-
term (typically 5 year) contracts.
The data show that only six of 50 long-term contracts al-
located since the enactment of competitive bidding on April 
23, 2003, have been allocated following the competitive bid-
ding process. The remaining 44 contracts have been allocated 
administratively.
The 1.4 million ha of short-term timber rights are allocated 
in the form of Timber Utilization Permits (TUPs) and Salvage 
Felling Permits (SFPs). Both of these are meant for a specified 
(smaller) number of trees: TUPs to district assemblies, town 
committees, rural community groups and NGOs for social 
and community purposes and SFPs for salvage of timber trees 
from smaller areas undergoing development, e.g. road con-
struction. Yet, the data show that all TUPs, 124 in total, have 
been granted to timber firms, not community groups. Fur-
ther, all TUPs have been granted to large tracts of forest – an 
average of 31.7 km2 – and not a specified number of trees. 
Likewise, all 448 SFPs in the database have been allocated to 
firms, and cover on average 22.9 km2.
(ii) Taxation level 
To investigate the taxation level, we relate the 2005 timber 
tax revenues to the stumpage value of the harvest in that 
year. Stumpage value is defined as the maximum amount 
that the most efficient logging company would be willing to 
pay the forest owner for the right to harvest a tree; assuming 
that prices of timber are set in a freely operating market and 
that a large number of firms are in competition. These condi-
tions are not fulfilled in Ghana, and hence we used interna-
tional log prices as basis for our analysis. 
Costs of felling, hauling, transport and port handling were 
obtained through a survey with 20 timber firms in Ghana. 
The stumpage value of the 2005 timber harvest is estimated 
at USD 307 million based on a harvest of 3.3 million m3 (0.9 
million m3 officially recorded and 2.4 million m3 of unre-
corded – illegal – harvest) (see also Hansen and Treue 2008). 
The total 2005 timber revenues are estimated at USD 19.9 
million. Thus, timber fees and taxes constitute approximately 
6% and 23% of the stumpage value based on the total and 
recorded harvest, respectively (Table 1).
Table 2 illustrates the approximate distribution of 2005 tim-
ber revenues assuming an immediate and 100 % collection 
as well as distribution. The Forestry Commission appropriates 
approximately half of the total revenues through its share of 
the stumpage fees and all export levies. The corporate tax 
revenue – comprising 26 % of the total revenue – goes to 
the government’s Consolidated Fund. The beneficiaries (Dis-
trict Assemblies, Stools and Traditional Councils) receive USD 
3.6 million, equal to 18 % of total revenues, but comprising 
a mere 1 % and 4 % of the stumpage value of the total and 
recorded harvests, respectively.
Table 1: Approximate 2005 revenues from timber fees and 
taxes in Ghana
Fee/tax Total revenue Share of total 
   timber tax revenue
 Million USD Per cent
Stumpage fee and concession rent 8.9 45
1% and 2 % export levies 5.5 28
Air-dried export lumber levy 0.3 1
Corporate tax 5.2 26
Total 19.9 100
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To illustrate that 2005 is not an unusual year, we compare the 
ratio between the volume-weighted royalty rate and the free-
on-board (FOB) export price of logs and lumber, respectively, 
for the period 1976–2005 (Figure 1). The timber taxation has 
remained at a low level throughout the observed period; the 
royalty-log price ratio does not exceed 4% in any year, except 
for 1994 and 1995. Yet, these years should be considered as 
»outliers«, since Ghana at that time experienced a log export 
boom of low-value species. 
Discussion and conclusions
The presented results illustrate that politicians in Ghana re-
main in control of timber rights allocation and that taxation 
policies and their implementation have maintained a low 
taxation level. This state of affairs goes against the official 
Figure 1: Volume weighed royalty rate/stumpage fee rate as percentage of weighed FOB log export price and weighed FOB  
lumber export price in Ghana, 1976-2005.
Beneficiary Dristribution of revenues 
 Million USD Per cent
Forestry Commission 10.4 52
Office of Administrator of Stool Lands 0.4 2
District Assemblies 2.0 10
Stools 0.9 5
Traditional Councils 0.7 4
Consolidated Fund 5.2 26
Forest Plantation Development Fund 0.3 1
Total 19.9 100
Note: Distribution under the assumption of immediate and 100 % collection rate of invoiced 
fees, and immediate distribution. 
Table 2. Approximate 2005 distribution of revenues from tim-
ber fees and taxes in Ghana.
forest policy justifications of revenue maximization and provi-
sion of incentives for efficiency in resource use to the logging 
and timber processing industry. 
Is this demise the result of ignorance, lack of information and 
irrational behaviour of politicians and policy makers? Hardly.  
It makes little sense to assume that politicians and policy  
makers should not be aware of, and give appropriate atten-
tion to, the implications of taxation policies that have impor-
tant consequences at national level for revenues, resource 
conservation and environmental services. Admittedly, there are 
problems of asymmetric information, i.e. determining opera-
tors’ cost, and incomplete information on international pricing 
of logs and wood products, but these can hardly explain an 
allocation and taxation regime that over decades have main-
tained a taxation level way below the stumpage value. 
Are politicians in Ghana simply responding to the demands 
of a powerful and efficient lobby? In relation to taxation in 
Ghana, the wood processing firms, organized in the Ghana 
Timber Millers’ Organization, would candidate as a strong 
lobby. The number of significant wood processing firms is 
relatively small, and many of the firms are associated in larger 
business groups. Moreover, these firms have large stakes in 
the regulation as they have benefited from low forest fees, 
absence of competitive bidding, and favourable corporate 
tax rebates and holidays. Yet, we find it odd if politicians 
should be »captured« to a degree where they allow poli-
cies that promote gross economic inefficiencies and violate 
the interests of other stakeholders. After all, the state has 
maintained substantive power over the resource and resource 
rents, which should insulate politicians from such demands, 
and the timber sector is not that important for the Ghanaian 
economy (ISSER 2008).
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The current state of affairs – that has persisted despite nu-
merous attempts at reform over the past decades – is rather 
the result of patron-client relations in which the political elite 
distributes patronage, in the shape of lucrative timber rights, 
to clients within and outside the timber sector in return for 
political support. As an example, the widespread allocation of 
TUPs and SFPs in Ghana since 2001 may imply a special form 
of discretionary allocation where timber rights are allocated 
as an ex-post reward for political support. These allocations 
are spread between hundreds of firms, many of which have 
no previous or subsequent track record in the timber sector, 
which, together with their timing immediately after the 2000 
elections, may imply allocation as reward for political support. 
In sum, we suggest that politicians, through discretionary 
control over timber rights and low forest fees, wield control 
over attractive rent-seeking opportunities which are ex-
changed for political support through patron–client networks. 
Lobbying and low capacity may be complementary expla-
nations, but can hardly on their own explain the observed 
outcomes. Thus, while acting in ways that are economically, 
ecologically and socially harmful, politicians are politically ra-
tional. The distortion is reproduced because it, at least up to 
this point, has been associated with low political costs.
The existence of such relationships may go a long way in 
explaining the slow pace of forest policy reform in Ghana 
and must be taken into consideration in current forest policy 
discussions in Ghana (and elsewhere), notably readiness 
activities in connection with Reducing Emissions from Defor-
estation and forest Degradation (REDD) and Forest Law En-
forcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) initiatives.
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